The sudden one North Salt Lake
An engineered slope, a state agency, and a chapter of city code
The Parkway Drive landslide, and the eleven years after it.
At about six in the morning on 5 August 2014 a slope above Parkway Drive failed, a mass roughly 500 feet by 500 feet with a main scarp about 60 feet high. It destroyed one home, damaged a swim and tennis club and put 27 households out of their houses. The Utah Geological Survey's own account of the cause is the sentence that matters most: this was an engineered slope that had been part of an aggregate mining operation in the 1990s. Here is what was fixed, what was not, and what a bench purchase now runs through.
Southern Utah is my home turf. North Salt Lake is not, so these pages are researched rather than lived: the facts come from the city, the Utah Geological Survey, the state air quality record and the operators themselves, and each one carries the date it was checked. A Davis County partner agent does the on the ground work here.
The live question
Is the Parkway Drive landslide still moving, and who would actually know?
The honest answer is thinner than the question assumes, and pretending otherwise would be the dishonest thing. The Utah Geological Survey installed GPS monitoring stations tracking downslope displacement from August 2014 onward and increased the monitoring frequency after the two reactivations of 2016. Press coverage of the survey's statewide landslide work in 2023 named two North Salt Lake areas under active watch, the Spring Hill Lane area and Parkway Drive, with in ground instrumentation. Beyond that, no published displacement figure for Parkway Drive after 2016 could be found. Checked 15 August 2026.
So the correct thing to do with this question is to ask the agency that owns it. The survey publishes contact names and direct telephone numbers on its own Parkway Drive hazard page, and a specific question about a specific parcel is exactly what those numbers are for. That is a better answer than any number a real estate page could give you, because the number would be out of date the following spring.
One more thing worth saying plainly before anything else. There is no Utah Geological Survey report number for this landslide. What the survey publishes is a hazard web page plus emergency response and Survey Notes material, not a numbered Report of Investigation or Open File Report, and a search of the publications catalogue returns none. The nearest thing to a formal study is a Utah State University graduate report by Brianna V. Hill, which is a graduate report and not a survey publication. A 2015 lidar dataset of the slide is hosted at OpenTopography, which tells you it was surveyed to research standard. If you meet a document citing a UGS report number for Parkway Drive, it is citing something else.
Parts of the lower slope were never remediated, and that is precisely where it moved again in 2016. The 2015 work regraded the slope and installed drainage systems between April and December, and the survey states plainly that parts of the lower portion of the landslide were not remediated because of ongoing legal issues. Both 2016 reactivations occurred in that unremediated lower section. The western one, behind 745 Parkway Drive, was documented on 9 March 2016 and by 17 May was about 70 feet wide and extended about 90 feet from scarp to toe. The eastern one, above the tennis court parking lot, was observed on 6 April 2016 with a main scarp that grew to an estimated 6 to 7 feet and a ground crack measured at about 10 feet deep. A remediation held up by litigation is a fact about a legal process, and the ground does not wait for one.
5 August 2014
Six in the morning, and four hundred thousand cubic yards of hillside.
The slope above Parkway Drive failed at approximately six in the morning on 5 August 2014. The landslide mass was roughly 500 feet wide by 500 feet long, with a main scarp about 60 feet high, and the survey's preliminary volume estimate was 300,000 to 400,000 cubic yards assuming failure depths of between 30 and 50 feet. Before it went, the slope carried about 200 feet of local relief at an average grade of approximately 45 percent, which is to say the ground rose 45 feet over every 100 horizontal feet.
The home at 739 Parkway Drive was pushed off its foundation and destroyed. The Eagle Ridge Tennis and Swim Club was structurally damaged, portions of a neighbouring yard and a recreational trail were removed, and 27 homes were evacuated. No account of the event that could be reached reports a death or an injury, which for a failure of that size at that hour is the single most important sentence in the whole story.
A note on names, because they drift. The survey calls the damaged facility the Eagle Ridge Tennis and Swim Club. The city guide on the practical side of this site calls it the Eagle Ridge tennis facility and news coverage of the litigation calls the plaintiff the Eagleridge Tennis Club. All three are the same place. The survey's version is the one used here.
Parkway Drive, in numbers
5 Aug 2014
at approximately six in the morning
500 by 500 ft
the landslide mass, with a 60 foot main scarp
27
homes evacuated; one home destroyed
45 percent
the average grade of the slope before it failed
The cause
This was not a hillside letting go. It was a mine face that had been signed off.
The survey's own wording is the most important sentence available on the subject and it deserves to lead rather than to sit in a footnote: the slope had been part of an aggregate mining operation in the 1990s and was subsequently reclaimed. What failed on that August morning was an engineered slope, made by people, graded to a design, accepted as reclaimed and then partly developed. That is a fundamentally different fact from a mountain deciding to move, and it is the fact that everything downstream of 2014 rests on.
The geology explains why the design did not hold. The upper portion of the slope coincides with the Lake Bonneville highstand shoreline, which is about eighteen thousand years old, and the section there is Lake Bonneville sands and gravels overlying Tertiary age tuffaceous sediments. In plain language: lake sand and gravel sitting on old volcanic ash sediment that weathers to clay. The clay is the slip surface. Cut into that stack at 45 percent and you have created a hazard whether or not anyone intended to.
Two miles north, the Springhill landslide formed in an abandoned gravel quarry that exposed the same weak clay rich layer under the same lake gravels. Same recipe, same era of aggregate industry, two entirely different failure styles. The Springhill page carries that one, and the side by side table on it is the clearest way to hold both at once.
One thing this page will not do is attach a company name to either slope. The survey names no operator for either failure and neither does anything else that could be reached, and there is no defensible way to connect today's Beck Street quarry operators to a slope that was mined in the 1990s. Naming the industry is accurate. Naming a firm would not be.
Part of an aggregate mining operation in the 1990s, and subsequently reclaimed. Eleven words from a state agency, and they carry the whole story.
The decade after
One morning of failure and eleven years of consequence.
The event is the part everyone remembers and the part that matters least to somebody buying here now. What matters is the sequence: what was fixed, what was not, why it moved again, and what is still unresolved. Every cell below carries what the source actually states rather than what the story implies.
| The failure | The 2015 remediation | The 2016 reactivations | The record now | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| What happened | The slope above Parkway Drive failed and the mass moved downhill | The slope was regraded and drainage systems were installed | Two separate failures reopened in the unremediated lower section | The survey monitors the site and press coverage in 2023 named it as one of two under active watch here |
| When | About six in the morning on 5 August 2014 | April to December 2015 | The western one documented 9 March 2016, the eastern one observed 6 April 2016 | Checked 15 August 2026 |
| What the survey measured | Roughly 500 by 500 feet, a 60 foot main scarp, 300,000 to 400,000 cubic yards at an assumed 30 to 50 foot depth | Not a measurement; the survey records that parts of the lower portion were left unremediated over legal issues | The western reactivation about 70 feet wide and 90 feet scarp to toe by 17 May; the eastern scarp 6 to 7 feet with a crack about 10 feet deep | GPS stations installed from August 2014, with frequency increased after 2016 |
| What it cost and who paid | One home destroyed, a swim and tennis club damaged, 27 homes evacuated | About 1.9 million dollars, split between the city, the developer and two gas companies, with no party accepting responsibility | No published remediation cost for the reactivations | No published displacement figure for this slide after 2016 could be found |
| What is still open | Nothing. The event itself is fully documented | The unremediated lower section, which is where 2016 happened | Whether either reactivation has been stabilised since | Every lawsuit outcome, and the current condition of the slide area and the development around it |
Dimensions, dates, remediation scope and reactivation measurements as published by the Utah Geological Survey on its Parkway Drive landslide page, checked 15 August 2026. The funding split comes from 2015 news of record rather than from the survey. Nothing in this table is a statement about the current safety of any property, and no page can be: that is a question for the survey, a geotechnical engineer and the documents attached to a specific parcel.
The bill
Four parties paid and none of them accepted responsibility.
The 2015 remediation came to roughly 1.9 million dollars and it was funded jointly without any party accepting fault: 625,000 dollars each from the City of North Salt Lake and from Eaglepointe Development, 375,000 from Questar Gas and 312,500 from Kern River Gas Transmission. Those four figures sum to 1,937,500, which is where the widely repeated round number of two million comes from, and it is worth carrying the components rather than the round number because the components tell you who was at the table.
The litigation ran alongside it and its shape is on the public record even though its outcome is not. The Eagleridge Tennis Club sued the City of North Salt Lake and Eaglepointe Development in spring 2015, alleging they knew of the landslide risk and were negligent. Kern River Gas Transmission filed a complaint against Eaglepointe Development seeking about a million dollars for assessing and protecting its pipelines. Eaglepointe answered and countersued, blaming Kern River Gas, the tennis club and a neighbouring homeowner. The homeowners denied that irrigation levels had triggered the slide.
And then the record stops. No verdict, no settlement terms and no dismissal could be found for any of it. The practical city guide on this site says that it will not characterise the outcomes because the public record it trusts does not state them, and that is the right position, so this page holds it too. It also declines to name the private individual named in the countersuit, who was a homeowner rather than a party with a press office, and who has no business being named on a real estate website a decade later.
Why the funding split is the interesting part
Look at who is on that list. A city, a residential developer and two gas companies, which tells you that what was at risk on that slope was not only houses but buried transmission infrastructure. It also tells you why the lower section stayed unremediated: with four payers, an unresolved allocation of fault and active litigation, the part of the job that nobody had agreed to own simply did not get done. That is a procurement story rather than a geology story, and it is the reason the ground reopened in March and April 2016.
What changed for buyers
Title 10, chapter 12, and the paperwork a hillside purchase now runs through.
This is the part of the 2014 story that follows a buyer around, and it is genuinely useful rather than frightening. North Salt Lake city code title 10, chapter 12 is the Sensitive Area District and Geologic Hazards chapter, and it is published in full at the city's code library. Verified there on 15 August 2026.
The chapter sets out purpose, definitions and applicability, then puts the obligation somewhere specific. Section 10-12-4 assigns responsibility for geologic hazard studies. Section 10-12-10 governs geologic hazard reports and requires that each one be site specific and identify all known or suspected potential geologic hazards, originating on site or off site, whether previously identified or previously unrecognised. That last clause is the one to read twice, because it means the report is not allowed to stop at the mapped hazard.
The chapter's appendices carry the technical standards. Appendix A sets minimum standards for surface fault rupture hazard studies, and a site inside the sensitive lands overlay zone or in any other area that may be subject to fault lines requires a site specific geologic investigation. Appendix C sets minimum standards for liquefaction investigations and evaluations, required before project approval on the basis of a land use and liquefaction potential matrix. Throughout, results must be presented in compliance with the chapter, its appendices and the latest guidelines adopted by the Utah Geological Survey.
That last cross reference is worth following. The survey publishes statewide guidelines for investigating geologic hazards, which is the professional standard a Utah geotechnical report is actually written to. Reading the survey's own summary of them is the fastest way to understand what the document in your purchase file is and is not claiming.
Ask for these documents
- The site specific geologic hazard study or geotechnical report for the parcel, not for the subdivision
- The seller property condition disclosures, read against the study rather than instead of it
- The city's hazard mapping for the parcel under title 10 chapter 12
- Any retaining wall approvals, which the city publishes separate guidance on
- The drainage design, because water is what makes this particular layer behave badly
Ask these questions
- Does the study address off site and previously unrecognised hazards, as section 10-12-10 requires
- Which edition of the Utah Geological Survey guidelines was it written to
- What is the current monitoring status of the nearest mapped landslide, asked of the survey
- How does the proposed homeowners policy treat earth movement, asked of an insurance professional
- What does the slope irrigation practice look like on this street in July
What this is not
- A reason to write off the bench, where thousands of households live without incident
- A substitute for a licensed geotechnical engineer reading a specific parcel
- Legal, engineering or insurance advice of any kind, from a page or from me
- A current statement about the condition of the slide area, which no issuing body publishes
- A comment on any lawsuit, none of which has a reachable outcome on the record
Living with it
Eleven years on, this is a document set rather than a drama.
The reason this page exists is that a search for this city returns a 2014 headline and almost nothing that follows it, and a headline is a bad basis for a decision in either direction. The useful version is that a mined slope failed, an ordinance followed, and a purchase on this bench now comes with a reading list the way a purchase anywhere comes with an inspection. That is a normal amount of homework for a hillside address on the Wasatch Front, and the same front produced three more landslides in this county in thirteen days of April 2023.
What has genuinely not been answered is worth listing, because a page that only tells you what it knows is only half honest. Nobody publishes the current condition of the slide area. Nobody publishes a displacement figure after 2016. No lawsuit outcome is on the record. There is no report number. And the survey's own answer to a question about today is a telephone number rather than a document, which is the correct answer and an unsatisfying one.
What this page will not tell you, and where to get it instead
- Whether a specific bench parcel is safe. That is a question for a licensed geotechnical engineer reading that parcel, and for the Utah Geological Survey on the monitoring status of anything mapped nearby. The survey publishes its contacts on the hazard page itself.
- How the lawsuits ended. No verdict, settlement or dismissal could be found for any of the 2015 filings, and inventing a tidy ending for a page's sake would be worse than leaving the gap visible.
- What the slide area looks like today. No issuing body publishes a current condition, no post 2016 city action could be found, and no redevelopment of the failed slope is on any record reached here.
- Who the neighbouring homeowner named in the countersuit was. He was a private individual and there is no public interest in repeating his name a decade later on a property website.
- What a bench address is like to live on day to day, as opposed to what it asks on paper. That is on the Eaglewood page, along with the golf course, the view streets and the fireworks line the city draws through them.
The other one
Springhill Geologic Park
The slower failure two miles north, and the only place in the county you can walk a slide and read the signs.
Read the guideThe bench itself
Eaglewood
The city owned eighteen, the view streets above it, and the seasonal rules that apply east of Orchard Drive.
Read the guideThe practical side
The North Salt Lake city guide
The money half of this decision, with prices, taxes, providers and what the market is doing now.
Open the guideKeep reading
More of North Salt Lake on The Local.
The slow one
Springhill Geologic Park
Eighteen homes over fifteen years, a buyout in 2012, and a park on the failure surface.
Read the guideThe trail door
Tunnel Springs Park
The city's own door onto the shoreline trail, and a network its committee calls broken.
Read the guideThe bench
Eaglewood
A municipal eighteen on the hill, a fireworks line drawn through the middle of a city.
Read the guideThe west flats
Foxboro
Eleven named parks on the flats, 8,208 feet of wetland trail, and no station of its own.
Read the guideMoving here
The refinery corridor
One refinery inside the line, four next door, and a noon alarm that is not meant for you.
Read the guideThe companion
North Salt Lake, in full
Two landslides, a bench trail door, a west side of eleven parks and one plant inside the line.
Read the pageQuick answers
Parkway Drive, answered.
At approximately six in the morning on 5 August 2014 the slope above Parkway Drive failed. The Utah Geological Survey records a landslide mass roughly 500 feet wide by 500 feet long with a main scarp about 60 feet high, and a preliminary volume estimate of 300,000 to 400,000 cubic yards based on an assumed failure depth of 30 to 50 feet. The home at 739 Parkway Drive was pushed off its foundation and destroyed, the Eagle Ridge Tennis and Swim Club was structurally damaged, and 27 homes were evacuated. No account that could be reached reports a death or an injury.
The survey's own wording is that the slope had been part of an aggregate mining operation in the 1990s and was subsequently reclaimed, which makes this the failure of an engineered slope rather than of a natural hillside. Before it went, the slope carried about 200 feet of local relief at an average grade of approximately 45 percent. The geology beneath is Lake Bonneville sands and gravels overlying Tertiary age tuffaceous sediments, and the upper portion coincides with the Lake Bonneville highstand shoreline. The volcanic ash sediment weathers to clay, and the clay is the slip surface.
Twice, in 2016, and both times in the section that had not been remediated. The western reactivation, behind 745 Parkway Drive, was documented on 9 March 2016 and by 17 May was about 70 feet wide and extended about 90 feet from scarp to toe. The eastern reactivation, above the tennis court parking lot, was observed on 6 April 2016, its main scarp grew to an estimated 6 to 7 feet in height, and an open portion of one ground crack was measured at about 10 feet deep. The survey increased its monitoring frequency afterwards.
Four parties, and none of them accepted responsibility. The 2015 work came to roughly 1.9 million dollars, funded with 625,000 dollars each from the City of North Salt Lake and Eaglepointe Development, 375,000 from Questar Gas and 312,500 from Kern River Gas Transmission. The slope was regraded and drainage systems installed between April and December 2015. The survey states that parts of the lower portion of the landslide were not remediated because of ongoing legal issues, which is where both 2016 reactivations occurred.
No outcome is on the public record that could be reached, and this page will not invent one. What is on the record is the shape of the litigation. The Eagleridge Tennis Club sued the city and Eaglepointe Development in spring 2015 alleging they knew of the risk and were negligent. Kern River Gas Transmission filed a complaint against Eaglepointe Development seeking about a million dollars for assessing and protecting its pipelines. Eaglepointe countersued, and the homeowners denied that irrigation levels triggered the slide. No verdict, settlement terms or dismissal could be found for any of it.
There is no numbered report. What the survey publishes is a hazard web page plus emergency response and Survey Notes material, and a search of its publications catalogue returns no Report of Investigation or Open File Report for this landslide. The nearest thing to a formal study is a Utah State University graduate report by Brianna V. Hill, which should be cited as a graduate report and never as a survey publication. A 2015 lidar dataset of the slide is hosted at OpenTopography, which shows it was surveyed to research standard but is data rather than a report.
It is the Sensitive Area District and Geologic Hazards chapter, published in full at the city's code library. It covers purpose, definitions and applicability, assigns responsibility for geologic hazard studies at section 10-12-4, and at section 10-12-10 requires that each geologic hazard report be site specific and identify all known or suspected potential geologic hazards, originating on site or off site, whether previously identified or previously unrecognised. Its appendices set minimum standards for surface fault rupture hazard studies and for liquefaction investigations, and results must comply with the latest guidelines adopted by the Utah Geological Survey.
Yes. The Utah Geological Survey installed GPS monitoring stations tracking downslope displacement from August 2014 onward and increased the frequency after the 2016 reactivations, and press coverage of the survey's statewide work in 2023 named two North Salt Lake areas under active watch, the Spring Hill Lane area and Parkway Drive, with in ground instrumentation. What is not published is a displacement figure for this slide after 2016. For a current answer the survey itself is the correct source and it publishes contact names and telephone numbers on its own hazard page.
That is not a question a website should answer for you, and this one will not. What it can tell you is what the purchase asks. City code title 10 chapter 12 requires site specific geologic hazard studies in mapped hazard areas and sets minimum standards for them, so the study, the seller disclosures, the hazard mapping for that exact parcel, any retaining wall approvals and the drainage design belong in the file. Standard homeowners policies commonly exclude earth movement, which is a fact about how policies are written and a question for an insurance professional rather than for an agent.
One morning in 2014, and a reading list that outlived it.
A bench address here is a genuinely good buy for the right household and it is a more specific purchase than a flats address, because the ordinance asks for documents most buyers have never read and the useful questions about them are technical. Send me the streets you are weighing and I will put you with a Davis County partner agent who knows which parcels sit inside the mapped hazard areas and who reads these studies as a matter of routine, and I will stay on the file for the financing side.
Referral disclosure. Outside Southern Utah, I connect home sellers and buyers with partner agents I trust in their area. If you choose to work with an agent I refer, that agent's brokerage pays my brokerage (Real Broker, LLC) a referral fee. The fee comes out of the agent's compensation; it is not an added cost to you. You are always free to choose any agent you wish, and using a referred agent is never required.